The paper considers alternative monetary policy regimes within a calibrated macroeconomic model with a traded and a non-traded sector. Two classes of regimes are considered; in°ation targeting and exchange rate targeting. When the target variable is completely stabilized, both rules have poor stabilizing properties for all real variables -nominal exchange rate targeting is even dynamically unstable. When the monetary authority places some weight on output stabilization in addition to the primary target variable, in°ation targeting outperforms exchange rate targeting in terms of output stability in both the traded and the non-traded sectors.
Introduction
There has been a tendency in recent years to abandon intermediate targets and steer monetary policy directly to the ultimate goal of monetary policy; price stability, in the meaning of low and stable Suppose there exist two policy rules which has the same stabilizing properties on aggregate output, but where one of the rules stabilizes both traded and non-traded output separately whereas the other produces large°uctuations in the two sectors. Most economists would agree that the former rule is preferable to the latter. There are reasons to believe that monetary policy may a®ect the sectors di®erently since the traded sector output is considered more sensitive to changes in the real exchange rate, whereas the non-traded sector output is more a®ected by the real interest rate through domestic demand. Monetary policy therefore has a potential for causing sectoral°uctuations. Stable aggregate production therefore does not necessarily mean that adjustment costs are low if aggregate stability relies on large sectoral°uctuations. A second rationale for distinguishing between sectors is that the costs of transferring resources may be higher between than within each sector. Eventually, adjustment costs may di®er across sectors. Adjustment in the traded sector may be more costly than adjustment in the non-traded sector. Then, sectoral output stability might be considered important in addition to aggregate output stability. There is thus a case for studying disaggregated models when analyzing alternative monetary policy regimes.
In the growing literature on in°ation targeting, we are aware of only a few papers that focus on traded and non-traded sectors. R¿island and Torvik (1999) compare exchange rate targeting and in°ation targeting within a simple theoretical model with a traded and a non-traded sector. They¯nd, among other things, that some earlier results from aggregated models are turned around in a two-sectoral model. For instance, a demand shock may induce higher aggregate output°uctuations with in°ation targeting than with exchange rate targeting, which is in contrast to the conventional wisdom. However, their model is kept overly simple, in particular in its dynamic structure, in order to focus on the new mechanism brought about by the two-sectoral structure. Holden (1998) also compares exchange rate targeting and in°ation targeting within a model with a traded and a non-traded sector. He focuses, however, on the equilibrium unemployment and not on the alternative regimes' stabilization properties. Chapple (1994) focuses solely on output stability in the traded sector and discusses the optimal weights attached to traded and non-traded goods in the target price index. He¯nds that targeting traded goods prices provides the highest output stability in the traded sector when the economy faces shocks to demand. Bharucha and Kent (1998) compare aggregate in°ation targeting and non-traded in°ation targeting within a calibrated dynamic two-sectoral model, much in line with ours. They¯nd that monetary policy should be more activist in response to exchange rate shocks for a (°exible) aggregate in°ation target than for a (°exible) non-traded in°ation target, while it should be more activist in response to supply and demand shocks under non-traded in°ation targeting. They focus, however, on stability in the non-traded sector and leaves out traded sector stability considerations.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we present the two-sectoral rational expectations model which we will use when evaluating the di®erent monetary policy rules. Section 3 considers two classes of targeting regimes; in°ation targeting and exchange rate targeting. In a targeting regime, the monetary authority conducts policy so as to minimize the deviations of the target variable from the targeting level. Both strict and°exible targeting are considered. By°exible targeting we mean that additional (secondary) variables are also being targeted. Given a model of the economy, a targeting regime implies a speci¯c instrument rule for monetary policy. The rules are derived under the assumption that the monetary authorities lacks commitment technology, so that there is nothing that prevents them from reoptimizing in later periods. The resulting rule is a perfect Stackelberg rational expectations equilibrium strategy (Backus and Dri±ll (1986) , Cohen and Michel (1988) , Blake (1992) ) that minimizes the loss-function of the monetary authorities. Section 4 concludes, while some technical issues regarding the solution procedure is left to an appendix.
2 The model
The model is kept as simple as possible to identify the various e®ects of shocks, but still capturing some important stylized facts. It is carefully modelled to re°ect the di®erent lags in the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The interest rate in°uences output with a one year lag and domestic in°ation after another year. Furthermore, the additional exchange rate channels work more quickly by immediately in°uencing CPI in°ation through import prices and, within a year, in°uencing domestic in°ation.
Re°ecting an assumption that the real (long run) equilibrium of the model is independent of the monetary policy regime 3 , all variables are measured as deviations from their unconditional expectations (steady state).
The price of traded goods is determined in the world market and is exogenous to the domestic producer. The law of one price applies, such that the price of traded goods is given by
where s t is the log of nominal exchange rate and p ¤ t is the log of the foreign currency price of traded goods.
Planned production in the traded sector in period t + 1 depends on the expected producer real wage in period t + 1, where expectations are rationally based on information in period t. Thus, there is a one period lag after the production decision has been taken until production is realized 4 . The supply function is thus represented by
(1) where y T t+1 is the log of output in the traded sector, w t+1jt is the expected log of the nominal wage, which is the same in both sectors and p T t+1jt is the expected log of the traded sector product price. A high sunk cost capital intensity in the production of tradeable goods will typically generate a higher degree of persistence. We model persistence by the inclusion of the lagged production term.
There is a downward sloping demand curve that determines output in the non-traded sector. We conventionally assume that the real interest rate a®ects consumption through intertemporal substitution e®ects and investment through the user cost of capital. Demand is also a®ected by the relative price of tradeables to non-tradeables through intratemporal substitution e®ects:
is the log of output in the sheltered sector, r t is the sheltered sector real interest rate, which is de¯ned by
¼ t+1jt is the rational expectations value of next period domestic in°ation rate formed today. e t is the real exchange rate, which is de¯ned by
The price of non-traded goods is determined by a constant mark-up over wages, i.e.
Since y T t and y N t are measured in logs as deviations from steady state, aggregate production is a weighted average of production in the two sectors, i.e.
where´is the share of traded production in steady state, 0 <´< 1. p c is the consumer price index (CPI), and its rate of change, ¼ c t = p c t ¡ p c t¡1 , is given by:
where ¢s t is the change in the nominal exchange rate and where we have used (11).
There is perfect capital mobility in the foreign exchange market, and its agents have rational expec-5 tations, which implies that the following real interest rate parity condition holds 56 :
where r ¤ t is the foreign real interest rate, which is de¯ned by
Due to our small economy assumption, the foreign disturbances are modelled in the simplest way possible. Both the foreign in°ation and the foreign interest rate processes are assumed to be AR(1):
By using (8) at the appropriate period and taking expectations in (10), substituting for the real interest rate in (9), we get the following expression for the foreign nominal interest rate:
The change in the nominal exchange rate is then given by:
The labour market is represented by the following wage curve:
5 The real uncovered interest parity follows directly from the nominal uncovered interest parity:
t on each side, we get:
and then rearranging:
which is the real uncovered interest parity. 6 We could explicitly have allowed for a risk premium term in this setup. However, nothing is lost by considering r ¤ the premium corrected foreign real interest rate -the domestic real interest rate level needed to keep expected changes in the real exchange rate equal to zero.
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Workers are assumed to be fully compensated for CPI in°ation with a lag. Alternatively, the wage equation can be interpreted as adaptive and non-rational expectations formation in the labour market, where expected CPI in°ation tomorrow is equal to CPI in°ation today. Wage in°ation is assumed to be related to the degree of pressure in the labour market, as represented by y t . Finally, wage in°ation responds to the real consumption wage disequilibrium, which is represented by the third term in (12).
Arguably, we could have included a more forward looking wage process, as suggested by Fuhrer and Moore (1995) . However, (12) has received rather good empirical support in several countries 7 and it is easy to interpret.
By using (3), (4), (12) and (6), we can write domestic in°ation as
We see that the real exchange rate a®ects in°ation in the non-traded sector through the wage response to consumer prices. In addition, it a®ects ¼ t through its e®ect on the level of activity, y t .
The monetary policy instrument is assumed to be the short-term nominal interest rate, 
The transmission mechanisms
The model has four transmission channels in which monetary policy may a®ect the economy. Three of these channels work through the exchange rate and the fourth works through the real interest rate.
The¯rst of these channels is the direct e®ect of a change in the nominal exchange rate, which has the most immediate e®ect on in°ation. This channel a®ects the price of tradeables directly and thus the prices of imported goods. The larger the share of tradeables in the CPI, as measured by µ; the stronger the impact of a given change in the nominal exchange rate on in°ation. In the above model, the direct e®ect from exchange rate movements onto in°ation is instantaneous. This is obviously a simpli¯cation 9 .
7 See Holden and Nymoen (1998) . 8 The coe±cients of the model is chosen from inspection of the impulse responses in the KVARTS empirical macromodel of Statistics Norway and con¯rmed by some regression analysis using instrument variables for future expected values.
Estimates of the variances of the shocks are taken from Evjen and Nymoen (1997) The second channel, which is often denoted the indirect e®ect of a change in the nominal exchange rate, is operational to the extent that the nominal exchange rate in°uences the (expected) real exchange rate. The real exchange rate in°uences production in the tradeable sector. One-period-in-advance expected changes in the real exchange rate in°uence the production decision in the tradeable sector.
However, unexpected changes have no immediate e®ect in this model, since the production decision in this sector is made one period in advance based upon the expected producer real wage in the coming period. It will, however, have e®ects later on, unless the process is reversed. Furthermore, the real exchange rate a®ects the non-traded sector due to substitution e®ects between the sectors.
The third transmission mechanism works directly through wages. The rate of change of nominal wages depends on CPI in°ation and deviation of the consumption real wage from its steady state. The real exchange rate a®ects both CPI in°ation and the consumption real wage, and thereby the domestic in°ation rate with a one period lag.
The fourth channel is the interest rate channel. Due to nominal rigidities, the nominal interest rate in°uences the real interest rate, which a®ects domestic in°ation through its e®ect on demand for non-traded goods.
Monetary policy rules
There is a relatively large literature on how to conduct monetary policy with the use of rules 11 . A large part of the literature evaluates rules that are designed to give guidance on how to set the instrument of monetary policy, the short interest rate or the monetary base. The literature on how to optimally conduct monetary policy and set interest rates in open economies when the central bank has been delegated a speci¯c macroeconomic objective or target such as keeping in°ation low or the exchange rate stable, is considerably smaller 12 .
through into import prices is very fast and almost all changes has taken place within a year of the change in the exchange rate. 10 See for instance Svensson (1998) and Ball (1998) . 11 See McCallum (1997) for an overview. 12 However, the literature is growing rapidly. See for instance Svensson (1998) and Ball (1998) . 
Policy optimization and targeting regimes
A targeting regime is de¯ned by the following optimization problem:
where
given the model in equations (1)- (13). The optimization problem is linear quadratic and therefore certainty equivalent (see Currie and Levine (1993) ), which means that the solution to the problem is independent of the distribution of the u's.
Alternative regimes can be represented by alternative choices of the a-parameters. Svensson (1997) speci¯es the characteristics of a (strict) targeting regime (rule) 13 as the solution to the above optimization problem with a unit coe±cient of a x ; where x is the targeted variable and zero restrictions on all other a's. A targeting regime is optimal in the sense that no other discretionary strategy gives a lower expected value of the monetary policy authorities loss function.
A formal treatment of the optimization procedure is given in appendix A. The procedure calculates the rational expectations solution for a given policy rule and iterates on the policy rule to produce the minimum loss of policy. This can be seen as a game between the policy maker and the market. Because we have forward looking variables in the model, there is a di®erence between the discretionary and the commitment outcome of the optimization procedure. We assume that the monetary policy authorities do not possess the commitment technologies to make the commitment solution credible. As we want policy to be time-consistent, we do optimization under the assumption of discretion in monetary policy following Backus and Dri±ll (1986) . In other words, we do not allow strategies of the monetary authority which there will be bene¯ts in deviating from at a later stage in the game. Furthermore, we assume that the policy goals are understood and believed by the private markets and hence the central bank enjoys full goal credibility within the discretionary framework.
13 Svensson uses the term "targeting rule" instead of our "targeting regime". We believe that our term is more appropriate as a rule could be misperceived in this discretionary framework. The terms, however, are interchangeable.
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The nominal interest rate is assumed to be the policy instrument, and the optimal time-consistent rule, that is, the rule that minimizes the loss given by (15), is in general a feedback rule where the interest rate depends on all the state-variables, i.e.
In this paper, we consider two main targets for monetary policy: CPI in°ation targeting and nominal exchange rate targeting. Both of these regimes provide a nominal anchor for the economy. Within each of these regimes, we distinguish between strict and°exible targeting. In the strict versions of these regimes, the sole objective of the authorities is to minimize variability of the primary target. Under°e xible targeting there could be several other secondary variables that is targeted in addition to the primary variable denoted by the regime name. There is in principle an in¯nite number of°exible regimes, depending on the weights attached to a linear combination of the targeted variables. However, we only consider one type of°exibility, namely that the monetary authority attaches weight to aggregate output in addition to the main target variable. We have chosen to attach a unit weight to each variable in the criterion function. This means that in the°exible regime the authorities target both the primary and secondary variable (output) to the same degree. Arguably, the secondary variables could instead have been given a smaller weight since they are in fact secondary. However, a smaller weight to the secondary variable gives a reaction function of the form (16) with the b-coe±cients being somewhere in between the strict and (our chosen)°exible regime.
We also study the consequences of extended interest smoothing in all regimes by attaching a unit weight to changes in the nominal interest rate in the loss function (a ¢i = 1). In our model, there are no economic reasons for disliking changes in the interest rate per se. However, it can be argued that in a larger model with a¯nancial sector explicitly modelled, interest volatility may have signi¯cant costs and should therefore be included in the criterion function. Another reason is the central banks' apparent reluctance to change the interest rate when the monetary authority is uncertain about the true economic model. This cautionary strategy may have attractive properties, as shown by Brainard (1967) . It turns of that interest smoothing may also in some circumstances have a positive e®ect on the discretionary equilibrium leading to lower variability of the targeted variables.
There is also a technical reason for allowing some degree of interest smoothing in every regime.
Under nominal exchange rate targeting, there exists a strategy which will completely stabilize the nominal exchange rate. This strategy requires that the domestic nominal interest rate is set equal to
Regimes
High degree of interest Low degree of interest (abbreviations) smoothing (a ¢i = 1)
SETis SET rate targeting Flexible (a s = 1; a y = 1) FETis FET Table 1 : Parameter values in the objective function (17) under di®erent regimes the foreign nominal interest rate at every point of time. This requires a completely°exible interest rate in order to keep the interest di®erential always at zero. However, such a strategy leads to model instability, as will be explained in the next section. This is a central feature of many models of monetary policy (Hall and Nixon (1997) ), and a feature that is obviously an unattractive feature to the authorities which delegated the exchange rate stabilizing objective to the central bank. By including some costs of changing the interest rate, it is possible to avoid such a strategy by forcing the monetary policy authority to rely on other strategies for reducing nominal exchange rate volatility. Since we will be comparing the di®erent regimes, we have included some costs of changing the interest rate in every regime. Table 1 gives an overview of the 8 targeting cases with their respective abbreviations.
Nominal exchange rate targeting
Under strict nominal exchange rate targeting, the interest rate is set so that the exchange rate is always at target, i.e.
If strict exchange rate targeting is credible, the domestic interest rate cannot deviate from the foreign interest rate:
where we have used that e t = p ¤ t ¡ p N t when s t = 0. Now, suppose that a positive demand shock to the non-traded sector occurs. Higher output increases expected domestic in°ation, which reduces the real interest rate. The decline in the real interest rate increases output further, and an expansionary spiral starts. This is the so-called Walter's e®ect (Walters (1986) ). Higher domestic in°ation produces a real appreciation, which eventually will dominate the Walter's e®ect, and the cycle turns into a self-enforcing recession. The stabilizing e®ect of the real exchange rate is not large enough to dominate the de-stabilizing Walter's e®ect. We therefore need to have some degree of°exibility in the exchange rate target in order to ensure stability. By attaching a small weight to the change in the interest rate in the loss function, we eliminate the i = i ¤ strategy, since this strategy requires a completely°exible interest rate. The exchange rate targeting central bank would now have to set the instrument in such a way that the exchange rate would "hover" as close as possible around the target level. This requires that the central bank uses the transmission channels in the best possible way to induce nominal exchange rate stability. Model stability is then a requirement for a rational expectations equilibrium in the model.
Would then a monetary union be unstable? It is important to point that our model not possibly can account for all of the elements in a monetary union like that of EMU. Our model focuses on some important aspects of monetary policy in a small, open economy with economic processes that not necessarily are similar to those in the target currency area. Increased factor mobility, an increased traded sector due to reduction in transaction and transport costs, convergence of wage processes, a more coordinated¯scal policy and integration, in general, may all contribute to stability beyond our narrow de¯nition of monetary policy. We, however, believe that our model may illuminate some problems that may occur in a monetary union, especially at the start of one, when the degree of integration may be low. Recognizing that there may be elements in the economy that may induce stronger stabilization than our baseline model can account for, we return to consider combined¯scal and monetary policies later in this section.
There are two opposing considerations when stabilizing the nominal exchange rate. First, short term stability in the nominal exchange rate requires that the domestic nominal interest rate follows the foreign interest rate tightly. Second, long term nominal exchange rate stability requires that the domestic price level is equal to the foreign level, so that a¯xed nominal exchange rate is consistent with the long run equilibrium real exchange rate. This might require that the domestic interest rate must, at times, deviate from the foreign interest rate in order to secure that the domestic price level returns to the foreign price level in the long-run. Table 2 shows the implied interest rate rules for the nominal exchange rate targeting regimes. In all these regimes policy responds mildly to disequilibrium conditions in the traded sector -with a coe±cient close to zero. This sector is relatively small (20 percent of equilibrium aggregated output) and accordingly has a small e®ect on the wage pressure in the labour market. Hence, it has only a small e®ect on domestic prices and the real exchange rate.
The interest rate rules exhibit a stronger response to deviations in the non-traded sector than in the traded sector because (i) this sector is the larger one and thus in°uences wages to a greater extent and
(ii) it is more responsive to the interest rate. The interest rate responses to domestic and foreign in°ation shocks are both very strong. A shock to domestic in°ation produces a real exchange rate appreciation, and a policy of reducing the persistent, domestic in°ation is required in order for the domestic price level to return to level that is consistent with the exchange rate target. A foreign in°ation shock, however, produces the need for a rise in domestic prices.
Monetary policy becomes very dependent on foreign monetary policy, as the foreign interest rate plays an important part of the reaction functions in all regimes. In the SET and FET regimes, the reaction coe±cients are both above unity. As foreign interest rate shocks exhibit a relatively high degree of persistence in our model, the domestic interest rate will have to be raised for a rather long time in order not to induce larger changes in the exchange rate. A high domestic interest rate will, however, produce a domestic recession which eventually calls for a lowering of the interest rate. Since the interest rate di®erential will "hover" around zero in order to produce nominal exchange rate stability, this eventual lowering of the interest rate will contribute to exchange rate stability if the interest rate was initially set su±ciently high.
As can be seen from Perhaps the most striking result in table 3 is the similarity between the SET and FET regimes.
Allowing the monetary authorities to target output in addition to the exchange rate has only a minor e®ect on the standard deviations of the variables. The standard deviations of output in both sectors drop slightly, but nominal exchange rate volatility increases approximately by the same magnitude. One interpretation of this is that a policy of targeting the nominal exchange rate requires output stability in order to bring the domestic price level in line with the foreign level. Thus, the scope for a tradeo® between output stability and exchange rate stability is limited. Evidently, a rather high degree of volatility in the targeted variable is unavoidable with this strategy, as the nominal exchange rate channels are important parts of the monetary transmission mechanism.
One contra intuitive feature is that nominal exchange rate volatility is smaller in the interest smoothing regimes than when nominal exchange rate targeting is the single objective of monetary policy. The discretionary equilibrium thus gives a better outcome for nominal exchange rate targeting if the policy maker is reluctant to change the interest rate. The loss due to interest rate changes works as a commitment mechanism for the central bank in achieving a lower variance of the nominal exchange rate -a solution that is closer to the optimal commitment solution. To understand this it is important to remember that the nominal exchange rate is forward looking. It depends on the expected future interest rate di®erentials in the model. As the central bank reoptimizes in every period, it can only to some extent in°uence these expectations in a favorable manner. The central bank uses the interest rate actively to set the domestic price level in line with the foreign level. It will prioritize the long run goal of exchange rate stability. However, if interest rate changes is punished, the¯nancial market will know that the central bank would be less likely to create large interest di®erentials that would produce exchange rate movements, and hence the central bank is getting a more favorable trade-o® between long and short term exchange rate stabilization. This might be an additional argument for the well known fact that the central banks indeed show smoothing behavior of its instrument (Walsh (1990) ). The ability of the central bank to be successful in reaching its goals in a nominal exchange rate targeting regime will increase if the central bank can signal a reluctance in changing the interest rate. However, variability in key variables increases. Comparing the SET/SETis regimes shows that increased interest smoothing behavior gives higher output variability, particularly in the traded sector.
In the°exible output targeting regime, interest rate smoothing has less e®ect on stability in the model. However, it still has markedly positive e®ect on the central bank's ability to stabilize the exchange rate.
In all four regimes, aggregate output stability is partly achieved at the expense of higher sectoral°u ctuations. As argued in the introduction, there are reasons to consider sectoral stability as well as aggregate stability. However, it is not obvious how sectoral stability should be measured. We have chosen to measure sectoral output variability (SOV ) by the square root of a weighted sum of the variances of each sector, where the weights re°ects the sectors relative sizes:
We can also get a measure of how much the regimes relies upon sectoral°uctuations to achieve aggregate stability by considering the unconditional correlation coe±cient between traded and nontraded production. Both these measures are considered in the following We also see that interest rate smoothing reduces the negative correlation between output in the two sectors. This means that interest smoothing is a way of reducing total adjustment cost to the economy by having a variance reducing e®ect on output in each sector. This may be another reason to consider interest smoothing.
Speci¯c shocks It may be interesting to consider the e®ects of di®erent shocks to the model in isolation. We consider four types of transitory shock to our model:
² a domestic shock to non-tradeable production, ² a domestic cost-push shock, ² a shock to the foreign real interest rate and ² a shock to foreign in°ation.
The magnitude of the shocks are: 1 percent for non-traded output, and 1 percentage point shock to nominal wage in°ation, the foreign real interest rate and foreign in°ation rate respectively. Figures at the end of the paper show the impulse responses in di®erent regimes to the four types of shocks. In each¯gure we have also reproduced the impulse responses for the strict nominal exchange rate targeting regime, which can be viewed as the benchline case. To get a measure of the impact of these shocks, we calculate the root mean square deviations (from their unconditional expectations) of key variables according to the formula:
2 where x denotes the variable in question. These measures are displayed in demand shock, cost-push shock, foreign real interest rate shock and foreign in°ation shock.
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There are a number of interesting conclusions that can be drawn from table 5. Output variability in the traded sector is low for both types of domestic shocks for the SET and FET regimes. However, interest rate smoothing changes this conclusion markedly and strongly exasperates these shocks. Interest rate smoothing also exasperates foreign in°ation shocks -although to a lesser extent in the FETis-regime.
In the non-traded sector, interest rate smoothing increases variability caused by demand shocks, but reduces variability due to cost-push shocks. The impact of foreign shocks in this sector is slightly reduced in the FET -regime and even more in the FETis-regime.
The nominal exchange rate responds most strongly to foreign in°ation shocks in every regime.
Interest rate smoothing has the e®ect of reducing nominal exchange rate variability for every type of shock. CPI in°ation reacts strongly to foreign in°ation shocks, as domestic prices follow foreign prices in order to stabilize the nominal exchange rate at the equilibrium real exchange rate level. Aggregate output stability is only to a small extent a®ected by output targeting and interest rate smoothing.
Active¯scal policy
As discussed above, when monetary policy is the sole stabilizing element of economic policy, nominal exchange rates can not be perfectly stabilized, since the rule i = i ¤ does not induce stability. Stability can, however, be ensured by other elements of policy, e.g. by active¯scal policy. In this section, we ask how strong the stabilizing e®ort of¯scal policy has to be in order to induce stability and so that the nominal exchange rate can be kept completely¯xed by letting the central bank eliminate interest rate di®erentials.
If this degree of activism is considered too strong and therefore unrealistic, we can ask the opposite question -what degree of exchange rate variability must be allowed if the economy is to be kept stable?
To capture active¯scal policy in a simple way, we assume that¯scal policy is represented by the following reaction function:
where d t is a measure of¯scal stance, e.g. the¯scal budget de¯cit 15 (measured as a proportion of total non-traded output). ¿ is a response coe±cient re°ecting partly the degree of automatic stabilization and partly the degree of¯scal activism of the¯scal authorities, normalized in such a way that a unit of d t corresponds to a unit of non-traded good. Thus,¯scal policy reacts linearly to both the output and CPI in°ation gap. One might also consider optimal¯scal policy, which minimizes a given loss function.
However, given the rigidity in¯scal budget decisions, such a policy seems unrealistic.
We assume¯scal policy has an immediate impact on non-traded demand. There is, however, a one-period decision lag. Equation (2) is then replaced by a demand equation that includes the¯scal demand component:
where we have used equation (5) and (6). There are several conclusions to be drawn from this experiment. First note that the nominal exchange rate is completely stabilized if the¯scal policy maker is committed to follow a policy that is slightly countercyclical. If¯scal policy is neutral or even slightly procyclical, the nominal exchange rate becomes volatile as a results of leaving the necessary stabilization policy to the monetary policy maker in order to avoid exploding paths.
Volatility of other variables than the nominal exchange rate increases when the¯scal policy moves from a neutral to a slightly active stance. Now, the central bank does not have to produce model stability and it can achieve its objective completely by setting i t = i ¤ t : The¯scal e®ort now brings about stability, but to a much smaller degree compared to the situation when¯scal policy was neutral and monetary policy allowed to contribute to stabilization. This indicates that there can be considerable gains in allowing the nominal exchange rate to°uctuate somewhat and use this°exibility to stabilize the economy.
A more activist stabilizing¯scal policy, in the form of an decreased ¿ ; reduces real exchange rate volatility and traded output variability markedly. Minimum variability in the traded sector is achieved at moderate levels of¯scal policy activism. Volatility reductions are also achieved for other variables, but to a lesser extent. Our model predicts that there are few advantages of committing to a very activē scal policy (¿ < ¡0:5) in a nominal exchange rate targeting regime.
There are considerable gains in allowing monetary policy to play a part in stabilizing the economy.
Allowing some degree of nominal exchange rate volatility can thus produce a more e±cient outcome. As¯gure 1 indicates, there is a signi¯cant cost, in terms of increased volatility of real variables, of stabilizing the exchange rate completely. This cost, however, is smaller the more active¯scal policy stabilization is.
CPI In°ation targeting
During the 1990s, explicit in°ation targeting regimes have been implemented in several countries. The in°ation rate cannot be considered a traditional intermediate target variable, since the central bank can only in°uence, and not control, the in°ation rate. However, Svensson (1997) argues that the central banks' conditional in°ation forecast can be treated as an intermediate target variable. By de¯nition, the in°ation forecast is the measure that, in expectational sense, is most highly correlated with future in°ation and is in°uenced (at some horizon) by the central bank -and thus satis¯es the condition for being a good intermediate target.
The undesirability of a completely¯xed in°ation rate One can, in principle, constantly keep in°ation on target by use of the direct exchange rate channel. However, such a strategy does not produce a good outcome in our model. As with a completely¯xed exchange rate, monetary policy is procyclical when the target is achieved exclusively by use of the direct exchange rate channel. To see this, note that ¼ c t = 0 implies from (6) that
Leading (22) one period, taking the expectation at period t and utilizing the uncovered interest rate relationship yields
By taking expectation in (13) and substitute for ¼ t+1jt ; exploiting (7) and¯nally using (22) to substitute for e t , we get:
The real interest rate is thus given by
If a positive demand shock occurs, the real interest rate decreases as a result of higher expected in°ation and a lowering of the nominal interest rate. The reason why the interest rate must be lowered is that a positive demand shock leads to higher expected domestic in°ation. In order to keep the CPI in°ation on target, an o®setting expected exchange rate appreciation is required, which, according to the UIP condition, implies a lower interest rate. Thus, monetary policy is even more pro-cyclical than with a completely¯xed exchange rate, since under the latter, the nominal interest rate remains unchanged.
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The higher domestic in°ation must be o®set by a continuous appreciation of the real exchange rate in order to reach the CPI in°ation target. Eventually, the e®ect of a stronger real exchange rate starts to dominate the e®ect of the lower real interest rate, and a recession arises. The result is stable, but strongly oscillating paths for the real variables.
As evident in table 1, we have included some interest rate smoothing even in the strict targeting cases. Some degree of interest rate smoothing does not change the strict in°ation targeting equilibrium signi¯cantly and is included in order to make the regime comparable to the nominal exchange rate regime.
Strict and°exible in°ation targeting
As for the nominal exchange rate regimes, we distinguish between strict and°exible regimes in accordance with the de¯nitions earlier in table 1. The reaction functions are shown in table 2. (14) The SIT regime requires a reaction function for the nominal exchange rate that is very close to the rule which exploits the direct exchange rate channel extensively in order to provide complete CPI in°ation stability (23). In such a regime, the real interest rate di®erential is adjusted in order to achieve real exchange rate changes that o®-set in°ationary pressure. As seen from the table 6, this strategy requires the interest rate to respond negatively to output in both sectors. This requirement, in addition to the low response coe±cient in front of the domestic in°ation term, is the source of the large oscillations in this regime. The negative coe±cient for the lagged real exchange rate is the sole component that eventually brings about stability. By introducing extensive interest rate smoothing, the SITis regime cannot rely only on the direct exchange rate channel in order to produce CPI in°ation stability, as this would have required a very°exible interest rate. Policy is much softer and responds less aggressively to all the state variables (except past interest rate).
When the monetary authorities explicitly stabilizes aggregate production in addition to the CPI in°ation rate in the FIT regime, policy responds to disequilibrium in the state variables in a stronger and more intuitive way. The interest rate now reacts positively to the output gap in both sectors in 21 order to prevent increased domestic in°ation and reduce output°uctuations. Interest rate smoothing continues to reduce the aggressiveness of policy.
Stabilization properties
In The SIT regime exhibits large°uctuations in the level of production, as the direct exchange rate channel is used strongly to stabilize CPI in°ation, which produces large real exchange rate°uctuations.
Even though there is some degree of interest smoothing in this regime, the solution is close to the solution that would be realized if the interest rate were completely free to move in order to keep CPI in°ation constant at its target level. By introducing extensive interest rate smoothing behavior, the SITis regime reduces output variability markedly in both sectors and at the aggregate level. Real exchange rate variability drops as the policy of almost exclusively using the direct exchange rate channel is abandoned and thus other transmission channels of monetary policy are used to stabilize CPI in°ation.
CPI in°ation variability increases somewhat and is now at the same level as domestic in°ation variability.
By comparing the two°exible in°ation targeting regimes, FIT and FITis, we see that the outcomes are not very di®erent. Thus, interest rate smoothing does not seem to change the results signi¯cantly in this regime. However, compared with the strict SIT/SITis regimes, output variability drops markedly at the expense of higher CPI in°ation variability. Table 8 shows that production in the two sectors are negatively correlated, which is the same result that was found for nominal exchange rate targeting. The sectoral output variability measure in (19) deviates from aggregate output variability, as aggregate stability is achieved at the expense of stronger sectoral°uctuations.
We¯nd that aggregate output variability underestimates the adjustment costs under in°ation targeting as it did for nominal exchange rate targeting. However, compared to nominal exchange rate targeting, the strict regime seem to rely less on intersectoral resource transfers as the correlation coe±-cient is closer to zero. The°exible regimes are more comparable. Interest smoothing does seem to have a positive e®ect on sectoral output variability as in the nominal exchange rate targeting case.
Speci¯c shocks
The RMSD measures for the CPI in°ation targeting regime for speci¯c shocks are displayed in table 9. demand shock, cost-push shock, foreign real interest rate shock and foreign in°ation shock.
In the SIT regime, the strong reliance upon the direct exchange rate channel produces extensive°u ctuations in both the traded and non-traded sectors for all kind of disturbances. The traded sector, which relies upon a stable real exchange rate, is, however, mostly a®ected by foreign disturbances.
Interest rate smoothing reduces output variability for all shocks and has in particular a good in°uence on the traded sector stability.
The FIT regime protects the traded sector well from domestic disturbances compared with the SIT regime. Non-traded sector output is also to some degree insulated from all types of shocks. As total output volatility is relatively low compared to sectoral output variability with respect to foreign disturbances, the outcome seems to rely on extensive transfer of resources between the sectors in order to provide aggregate output stability. Interest rate smoothing increases variability in the traded sector for domestic shocks and decreases variability for foreign shocks. Interest smoothing will have much of the same e®ect in the non-traded sector, but will here also reduce volatility with respect to domestic supply shocks. Aggregate output is much less a®ected by interest smoothing, which means that the positive e®ects from interest smoothing is based upon inter-sectoral resource transfers.
Active¯scal policy
In section 3.2.2, we saw that the outcome of nominal exchange rate targeting is heavily in°uenced by the degree of¯scal policy stabilization. We now go on to evaluate the e®ects from¯scal policy under CPI in°ation targeting.
As described earlier, we continue to represent¯scal policy by the simple¯scal rule (20). Fiscal policy reacts to disequilibrium in aggregate output and CPI in°ation with a one-period lag, but has an instantaneous e®ect on the non-traded sector production. We vary the coe±cient ¿ in the interval ¿ 2 [¡1:0; :1] ; where the lower limit represents the most active countercyclical¯scal policy and the higher limit a slightly procyclical policy. A comparison of panels a and b in¯gure 2 shows that the°exible in°ation targeting regime response to¯scal activism produces a much more mixed outcome. However, one striking feature is that the SIT regime requires a fairly strong¯scal policy activism in order to have an outcome that is comparable to the outcome in the FIT regime under neutral¯scal policy. CPI in°ation variability decreases with a more active¯scal policy, but traded sector output shows a slightly increasing variability as¯scal policy becomes more active. Non-traded output variability increases with stronger countercyclical¯scal policy up to a certain point, and thereafter variability is moderately reduced. However, except for CPI in°ation variability, most variables are only moderately a®ected by¯scal policy.
Conclusions
The paper has analyzed alternative monetary policy rules within a model with a traded and a non-traded sector. Two main types of rules have been considered; CPI in°ation targeting and nominal exchange rate targeting. The rationale for considering the traded and the non-traded sectors separately, and not just the economy as a whole, is that there are reasons to believe that sector-speci¯c°uctuations have welfare e®ects beyond those of aggregate°uctuations. For example, adjustment costs in production might lead to welfare gains from stabilizing each sector if resources cannot be transferred between the sectors free of costs. Our results seem to indicate that the choice of monetary policy target a®ects the two sectors rather di®erently. Our view that the two sectors should be treated separately when evaluating policy rules, is therefore supported by the results.
If the main policy objectives are to stabilize output and CPI in°ation, there seems to be a clear case for choosing a form of CPI in°ation targeting in our model. However, the results also indicate that one should avoid a policy of keeping either CPI in°ation or the nominal exchange rate¯xed, as this would mean strong output volatility. In the nominal exchange rate targeting regime, a¯xed exchange rate would even produce explosive oscillations. Output stability is more successfully achieved in both the traded and the non-traded sector under°exible CPI in°ation targeting compared with the equivalent 25 nominal exchange rate targeting rule. An important conclusion in our model is also that traded sector output is, in general, less stable than non-traded sector output -irrespective of the choice of regime.
As would be expected, active¯scal countercyclical policy helps stabilizing the economy in all the regimes. The strict regimes bene¯ts in particular when there is a high degree of¯scal countercyclical policy. For strict nominal exchange rate targeting, stabilizing¯scal policy induces asymptotic stability, and the monetary authorities are able to stabilize the nominal exchange rate completely. However, a completely¯xed nominal exchange rate creates a need for (unrealistically?) strong¯scal activism in order to replace the stabilizing e®ects from monetary policy. Even with a very strong countercyclical scal policy, it cannot replace the stabilizing e®ects of allowing some degree of nominal exchange rate°u ctuations in order to stabilize output in both sectors. We are left with the conclusion that even in a nominal exchange rate targeting regime, one should allow the nominal exchange rate to°uctuate within large bands if output stability is considered important. 16 .
A strong form of¯scal policy activism is also needed for stabilizing the economy in the strict CPI in°ation targeting (SIT) regime. As¯scal policy activism is increased, most real variables are stabilized more quickly in this regime than in the SET-regime, and CPI in°ation variability is kept very low.
The most stable regime is the°exible CPI in°ation targeting regime. In this regime, monetary policy provides the highest degree of output stability, and CPI in°ation variability is lower than in any of the nominal exchange rate targeting regimes. When¯scal policy participates in stabilizing the economy, real stability is not much a®ected, but CPI in°ation variability is reduced considerably.
With our dynamic model, we do not¯nd that cost-push shocks in general favor nominal exchange rate targeting and demand shocks favor in°ation targeting, as found in e.g. the more static models of R¿dseth (1996) and R¿island and Torvik (1999) . This suggests that the dynamic stabilization properties of in°ation targeting may be superior to the dynamic properties of exchange rate targeting.
If inter-sectoral resource transfers involve costs, as suggested in the introduction, CPI in°ation targeting seems preferable to nominal exchange rate targeting. However, if there are large costs of changing the interest rate so that the central bank smooth their interest rate setting, the choice of targeting regime becomes less important for stabilization considerations.
16 The European Exchange Rate Mechanism allowed for exchange rate volatility by having large tolerance bands around their target exchange rate. These bands could allow the national central bank to have some in°uence on domestic monetary policy by allowing some°uctuation. However, it can also be argued that these bands were mainly there as a shock absorber for policy non-credibility e®ects and varying risk premia.
A The discretionary optimization procedure
The optimization procedure is described in Backus and Dri±ll (1986) and S¿derlind (1999) 17 . Here we review this method with respect to our two-sectoral model. The model can be written conveniently on the following form:
where A = 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
Note that the X matrix is ordered in such a way that the forward looking variable, e t , is the last variable.
Our objective function in (14) can be written in a more general form:
where 
where T x de¯nes the relationships between the target variables x and the state-variable vector X: These matrixes are in our case:
We are very indebted to Paul SÄ oderlind for presenting this solution method to us.
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and U 9x1 = T 0 i¡ a 6 and R 1x1 = a 6 : Our problem is now to minimize (25) given (24). We go on to partition the X matrix:
0 : Since our loss function is quadratic, the value function is quadratic and the Bellman equation can then be written accordingly:
where V t+1 and v t+1 -the parameters in the value function -so far are unspeci¯ed. The Q matrixes are given by (26) and U 1 = [ 0 0 0 0 0 ¡a 6 0 0 ] 0 : The expectation of the forward looking variable can be written as a linear function of the expectation of the predetermined variables:
where C t+1 is a known vector of parameters that remains to be solved for. By using this relationship and taking expectations in (24), we get 18 h x 1t+1jt e t+1jt i = h A 11 A 12
and after expressing the non-predetermined variables as explicit functions of the predetermined and instrument variables, you get:
he real exchange rate can be extracted from the above system of equations:
where H 1t and K 1t is de¯ned accordingly. Now using (28) in (24) we can extract an expression for the backward looking variables: By using (28) in the instantaneous period t loss of (27) and denoting this by j t , it becomes: 
By substituting this expression into (27) and using (29) you eventually get:
which should be minimized with respect to i t : The¯rst order condition is:
which means that the optimal rule for the interest rate is:
where F is de¯ned accordingly. We can now use (30) in (28) in order to get:
which means that C t+1 = (H 1t ¡ K 1t F t ): The optimal value function can now be written in terms of the predetermined state variables only, x 1t :
which gives an equation for
The above procedure is recursive and describes an iterative process. When the process converges, we have found the path for the interest rate as well as the non-exploding path for the exchange rate:
From (24) the path for the predetermined variables can also be calculated accordingly: ( 35) the long real interest rate is determined by the average time to maturity, the short foreign interest rate and the real exchange rate. We have rather arbitrarily set T = 7 to represent the average time to maturity.
If we assume that both the short and the long interest rate equally contribute to demand for nontraded goods, then we can replace the equation (2) Table 10 shows the unconditional standard deviations of key variables in our model. If we compare these results with the results in our original model, there are some features that are worth mentioning.
Strict in°ation targeting now produces a better equilibrium in terms of lower output variability in both sectors -and is much more viable than in the original model. The trade-o® between in°ation and output variability is not as steep as before since manipulation of the real exchange rate that is required to stabilize CPI in°ation has a greater impact on production. A real appreciation that comes about because of a need to reduce CPI in°ation, reduces domestic demand to a greater extent through a rising long real interest rate -which has an impact on the underlying domestic in°ation.
A¯xed nominal exchange rate is a stable policy alternative in the above model, and hence, strict nominal exchange rate targeting produces this outcome. The outcome in terms of output and in°ation variability is however much worse than in the original model. Since domestic demand now relies much less upon the short real interest rate, the Walters e®ect does not cause an unstable model. However, due to the possibility of completely¯xing the exchange, exasperate the remaining Walters e®ects features in our model and output becomes more volatile.
There is now a bigger di®erence between the strict and°exible nominal exchange rate regimes since the latter strategy deals more e®ectively with the Walters e®ect.
Flexible in°ation targeting still remains the best regime in terms of output variability and compare to our original model, CPI in°ation variability is markedly reduced. 
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